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Stability, integration and political modalities:
some American reflections on the European
project after the financial crisis
DAVID A. WESTBROOK*

To those of us concerned with transnational law, and especially the role
of German law on the global stage, it does not need saying that Professor
Detlev Vagts is highly deserving of that Germanic and traditional scho
larly honour, a Festchrift. (In this context, 'does not need saying' of
course means 'should be said repeatedly'.) We all owe Detlev Vagts,
and as a Germanic traditionalist, I would be delighted to contribute to
this volume on general principle, even if I did not know the man. But I
also have personal reasons for wanting to honour Professor Vagts: he
taught the basic course in corporations to generations of students at
Harvard Law School. In addition, Vagts was one of the advisors to the
Ford Fellows Program, which was designed to foster international law
teachers. After being one such student and one such fellow, in due course
I became a teacher of international and corporation law, so I owe Vagts a
double debt of professional gratitude. And, as with so many other young
(or once young) scholars, Vagts has been cordially supportive of my
efforts to find my way in the academy, for which I am most grateful.
Such things said, however, there is another reason I am happy to have
the chance to contribute to this Festschrift. A certain delicacy is called for
here, especially since writing for Vagts carries me halfway back to
Harvard, where such things are taken so seriously. But enough beating

* Some of the thinking in this chapter was first expressed in the context of 'policy round
tables' hosted by the European Commission's Bureau of European Policy Advisers
(BEPA). My thanks to Vitor Gaspar, and to the BEPA, for inviting me to participate in
these transnational intellectual exchanges, which I am sure Vagts would have enjoyed.
Thanks also to Pierre d' Argent, Jean-Marc Gollier, Rosa Lastra and Dirk Schoenmaker for
very helpful comments. The infelicities and outright mistakes are my own.
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around the bush: I was not the strongest student in that corporations
course. Actually, I was some distance away from the strongest student. In
fact, I could not see her. I have excuses, of course, but the bottom line is
that this chapter is a chance not only to honour a dedicated scholar and
devoted teacher, but also for academic redemption.
I do not seriously propose that the financial policy community adopt
the flippant Christian stance with which I am playing here. But this
chapter is written as we (appear to) have hit the bottom of the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression. Even if the bottom has been
reached, the damage done around the world has been great, and it will
take many years to recover. Here in the United States, it is quite possible
that some things - a measure of trust in certain key institutions, a sense of
workingman's possibility, what might be called republican spirit, perhaps even a degree of national creditworthiness - have passed from the
scene. In Europe, the financial crisis revealed not only substantial weaknesses in the internal market, but also, and more troublingly, cracks in
the European project itself. Policies and institutions that seemed essentially 'European' in scope and orientation during good times were
revealed to be, when conditions got tough, fundamentally national
after all. Bluntly, after the crisis it appears that the process of integratio11
begun after the Second World War may not have progressed as far as
many believed not so long ago.
It is not my purpose, especially not in the pages of a Festschrift, to cast
blame. But the fact remains that financial policy on both sides of the
Atlantic (and elsewhere) failed in a host of ways; the 'entire edifice'
collapsed, as former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Alan
Greenspan, put it to the US Congress. The failure of a raft of financial
policies - to say nothing of the complete absence of collective consideration of a host of topics which proved expensively relevant in the years
2007-09 - ought to give pause to those of us who profess to teach finance.
Perhaps we have no need for redemption, but with one in four American
children on food stamps and more than the suspicion that the Great
Recession was caused by overweening faith in finance itself, I am not
so sure. The matter is worth careful thought. Surely, however, the tendency
of financial elites to congratulate themselves on navigating 'the tsunami' on surviving the massive failure of their own policies - is misplaced and, in
light of the damage done, more than a little unseemly.
I should immediately point out that Vagts came of intellectual age
when the currents which engendered the latest crisis were mere rivulets.
In class, he had none of the narrow-minded certainty which marked the
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heyday of law and economics. His view of the business world and the
lawyer's role in it was always more nuanced. Even in the basic course on
corporations, Vagts tried to instil an understanding that things were
often done differently, elsewhere (an attitude taught by comparative
law), and had been done differently, even here, at other times (an attitude
taught by history). More deeply still, Vagts was quite aware of human
fallibility, and its sometimes awful potential - he freely admitted to being
marked by the Second World War. So had we as a nation kept some of
these lessons in mind, would our economy be in better shape than it is
today? Perhaps, but there are reasons we speak of manias - and even
Newton got caught up in the South Seas Bubble.
But it also may be hoped that we learn from crises. We should ask:
What aspects of the old understanding of financial markets now seem
compromised, perhaps simply wrong? What are the immediate intellec
tual consequences of this crisis for the political economy, and especially
the political economy of Europe? Does this crisis provide us with oppor
tunities as well as problems and, if so, what might those opportunities be?
A caveat: the reader who hopes that this chapter will provide definitive
solutions to the practical problems raised by the crisis will be disap
pointed. Such a reader is asking the wrong question. There are real
limitations on the extent to which an intellectual, operating in the
abstract, should offer specific advice to responsible decision-makers.
The world has plenty of armchair generals, Monday-morning quarter
backs and garrulous academics. Instead of second guesses, we should
attempt to take advantage of critical distance to provide a cooler analysis
and a longer view than is available to those in the trenches, perhaps
accompanied by a few tentative and general suggestions by way of
demonstrating a desire to be constructive. As a good friend often puts
it, 'I am not in charge', and I offer my sympathies to those who are.
As I write, toward the end of 2009, it is generally acknowledged that the
recent economic crisis exposed serious weaknesses in the structure of
European financial markets. To sketch the story in abstract terms: in
2008 and 2009, a number of bank crises required government interven
tion.1 Although the European Central Bank (ECB) made liquidity avail
able to the central banks of Member States, kept interest rates low and
1

The European financial landscape is, as ever, dominated by banks. The financial crisis that
presented across a variety of institutions in the United States was experienced in Europe
as essentially a crisis in the banking sector.
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has been credited with avoiding panic in the financial markets, no
European institution had the legal authority or the resources required
to serve as lender of last resort to 'private' institutions. In the same vein,
no European institution had the capacity, legal or otherwise, to resolve
insolvent financial institutions, or to insure depositors, maintain trading
positions, or otherwise intervene to stabilise financial markets. In Europe
during the financial crisis, therefore, most government interventions
were in fact, and of practical and legal necessity, interventions by
Member States - i.e. national governments. In so intervening, generally
spending taxpayer money, national governments tended to act on a
national, as opposed to a European, basis.
A number oflessons can be learned from this story. Perhaps the first is
that monetary integration, European Monetary Union (EMU), may not
provide financial stability, even if currency stability is achieved. Using
the traditional tools of central banking, the ECB maintained the stability
of the Euro as a currency before and throughout the financial crisis. The
crisis happened nonetheless. After the fact, it is obvious enough that
radically overleveraged institutions may impose systemic risks, even if
their balance sheets are reckoned in a then-sound currency. More theoretically, money supply cannot be divorced from the extension of credit,
leverage; market confidence cannot be divorced from the volume, character and velocity of trading. Banks and other financial institutions,
however, not just central banks, extend credit and trade. Financial
stability, therefore, requires not only sound money, a well-managed
Euro, but prudent institutions to manage such money. To put matters
gently, many European banks were imprudent.
A complication: in (overly positivist legal) theory, much banking
regulation is harmoniously conceived at the European level, and implemented at the Member State level. So we may speak of European banking
regulation. Supervision and resolution, however, are matters of Member
State competence. But positivists tend to forget that law on the books is
not what matters to sound policy; law cannot be understood apart from
its social context, including its implementation. (This is especially true in
the case of financial regulation. For example, US securities law is hardly
to be understood by reading the statutes.) At this level of analysis, the
once-easy claim that European banking regulation is fairly harmonised
begs more than a raised eyebrow: actual Member State implementation
of regulation, deeply intertwined with supervision, meant that political
constraints (regulation in the broad sense used in US policy discourse)
on European banks in the years leading up to the crisis varied
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considerably from country to country. In short, integrated European
banking law leading into the crisis was partially achieved at best, and
further fragmented by essentially national responses to the crisis.
At the same time, European banks often operate across borders,
indeed have been encouraged to operate across borders in furtherance
of European financial market integration. More specifically, transna
tional financial operations have been intentionally facilitated by the
single currency.2 Access to the European market has meant that the
banks of relatively small countries might have considerable operations
in much larger economies. Failure of a big bank based in a small country
is unlikely to be successfully resolved by the government of that country.
Putting this all together, it might be said that transnational systemic risk
was facilitated, if not caused, by the emergence of a more integrated
European financial market, coupled with the failure of fundamentally
national oversight regimes. 3 The desire for financial stability, especially
when coupled with monetary integration, would thus seem to imply not
only regulatory reform, but financial law that was more integrated in fact,
not merely in bureaucratic wish.
However, as noted above, supervision and resolution of financial
institutions in Europe are largely matters of Member State competence.
Member States guard their jurisdiction over such issues especially jea
lously because the fisc of, and the asset values within, each Member State
are affected. As a result, and as demonstrated in the events of 2008,
responses to institutional crisis tend to be national and therefore both
partial and fragmented. Conversely, truly integrating European financial
policy would require at least substantial burden-sharing for the super
vision and especially resolution of financial institutions. A contrast is
often drawn with the United States, where the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury, operating on the Federal level, not only supervise, but also have
the resources to intervene directly. No analogue exists on the European
level, and it is difficult imagining European institutions acquiring such
competences or resources within the foreseeable future. So, to generalise,
the 2008 crisis demonstrates what has been suspected for some time: true

2

3

This point should not be overdone. Contagion often occurs across currencies, and did in
this crisis. Rephrased, a single currency may encourage cross-border operations, but is
hardly a sine qua non for cross-border problems.
It should immediately be noted that this problem is not unique to Europe; one might say
much the same thing on a global level with regard to Lehman Brothers - i.e. national
regulatory failure allowed a transnational systemic risk to be realised.
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European monetary union is stymied, or at least profoundly constrained,
by the lack of European fiscal integration. 4
In the same vein, although existing national regulation of financial
institutions is derived from European directives, and such regulation has
been shown to be in need of reform (both weaker and less well integrated
than one might have hoped, when times were good), substantial new
European directives do not seem likely. Recent political developments such as the French and Dutch 'no' to the proposed European
Constitution; the exceedingly difficult passage of the Lisbon Treaty;
and the German Constitutional Court's suggestion that no further derogation to the EU could be allowed under German law - strongly suggest
that financial institutions will be governed more on the national, rather
than the European, level for the foreseeable future. And, as has also been
suggested, since the Union does not have the power to tax and does not
look to acquire the power to tax anytime soon, only Member States
(indeed, only large Member States) possess the ready cash required to
intervene in a banking crisis. Such interventions, however, tend to fragment, rather than integrate, the European financial system. The true
integration of European financial law, therefore, seems to be both more
necessary, and much farther away, than many people thought even
recently.
In a draft paper that has attracted considerable attention in policy
circles, Dirk Schoenmaker elegantly if very schematically states this
problematic as the 'trilemma' of financial stability: 'a stable financial
system, an integrated [European] financial system, and national financial
autonomy are incompatible. Any two of the three objectives can be
combined but not all three; one has to give.,s In the crux of the paper,
Schoenmaker argues that in an integrated financial market, defined as a
market in which important institutions have substantial cross-border
operations, a national regulator may rationally but inefficiently decide
not to save some systemically important financial institutions, because
the national government does not gain from rescuing banking operations
conducted in foreign countries. Exhibit A for this claim would be the
failure of Fortis.
4

5

See, generally, R. Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (Oxford
University Press, 2006), chapter 10.
D. Schoenmaker, 'The Trilemma of Financial Stability', draft available at ssrn.com/
abstract=l340395. The trilemma image is well established in monetary policy, and
Schoenmaker and others have used the image to make versions of this argument for
some time. See Lastra, Legal Foundations, supra n. 4, and the sources cited therein.
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Schoenmaker assumes (perhaps slighting the long Dutch tradition of
fiscal independence?) that financial stability is self-evidently the cardinal
virtue: the trilemma is thus resolved into a conflict between an integrated
European financial market, on the one hand, and national control over
financial institutions (and their resolution) on the other. From a
European (as opposed to a national) political perspective, and from a
relatively orthodox liberal economic perspective, both the course of
history and the national order favour expansive and integrated financial
markets, and so we learn that supervision is 'still' done at the national
level. By now, we are on familiar ground. The trilemma is not difficult as
an intellectual matter: the desire for financial stability requires integra
tion of regulation, oversight and even resolution on the European level,
founded on a degree of fiscal integration, and national financial auton
omy has to give way. As a political matter, however, European progress is
frustrated, here as elsewhere, by the parochial interests of national
governments. The European financial markets, then, seem doomed to
some messy combination of halting integration/national fragmentation,
coupled with structurally inadequate supervision (and lagging regula
tion), resulting in financial instability and associated disadvantages in the
real economy.
Are matters really as gloomy as the trilemma so logically implies? If not,
what is wrong with the broadly shared assessment of the situation of
European financial markets and their regulation that the trilemma so
elegantly articulates? In short, how should European policy-makers
confront the trilemma?
Two implicit aspects of the problematic seem analytically significant to
me. First, the trilemma has a complex relationship with liberal economic
thought. On the one hand, the choices highlighted by the trilemma were
long obscured, in Europe and elsewhere, by a liberal economic orthodoxy
that did a fair job ofaccounting for relatively stable markets. On the other
hand, the trilemma is logically dependent on the same liberal economic
orthodoxy, which raises issues if one no longer believes. 6
Second, both the trilemma and what I take to be the dominant under
standing of the European project are informed by a particular political
imagination that associates scale with centralisation, centralisation with
rationalisation and rationalisation with progress. As an intellectual
6

See, generally, D. A. Westbrook, Out of Crisis. Rethinking Our Financial Markets
(Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2009).
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matter, I do not think this is correct - to quip, it is to mistake the history
of France for the history of globalisation, and also for the deep structure
of the European project. 7 But whether or not the imagination of politics
dominant in Europe made sense at one time, or even makes sense in the
abstract, this imagination does a poor job addressing the problems of
economic integration across jurisdictions, either globally or in Europe,
and either now or for the foreseeable future. Neither nation-states nor
Member States are going to surrender jurisdiction to a government
whose scale matches that of the economy.
Consequently, we must find ways to think politically about financial
market regulation under conditions of decentralisation. Fortunately,
European traditions of law and politics apart from the administrative
centralisation associated with the rise of the modern nation-State, and
another ofVagts' areas, American commercial law, have things to teach
about creating integrated and reasonably well-governed markets across
jurisdictions.
In times of relative economic stability, it is easy enough to understand
markets as ordinarily efficient and largely self-correcting. In such times,
regulation and supervision of banks and most other key financial institu
tions remain necessary (only a particularly ideological American might
think otherwise), but attract relatively little attention (bank failure has
not been so interesting for generations). And thus for many years in
Europe, banks were encouraged to develop their risk management mod
els; monetary union proceeded without regulatory integration, and that
seemed not only politically necessary but untroubling; and Member State
governments were left to regulate and supervise the institutions estab
lished within their jurisdictions. Moreover, variances among Member
State regulation were seen as an impediment to the integration and
expansion of financial markets - that is, to cost money and be inefficient,
just as variances among regulatory regimes for other goods and services
were traditionally thought to be at odds with the achievement of a true
single market. So the project was to work national regulatory barriers
down, gradually shifting competence to European institutions and,
through the Second Banking Directive and otherwise, to encourage
financial institutions established in one Member State to do business in
others. During these years, the European financial order was relatively
stable - a bit sluggish, perhaps, but stable.
7

See, generally, D. A. Westbrook, City of Gold. An Apologyfor Global Capitalism in a Time
of Discontent (New York and London: Routledge, 2003).
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Under such circumstances, the trilemma's conflicts, among European
and national jurisdictions and financial stability, are hardly apparent. It
is only when financial markets are unstable, systemically important
institutions are failing and massive and decisive government interven
tion is required, quickly, that the trilemma's questions - 'which govern
ments can effectively do what, for whom'? - arise. Suddenly national
regulatory, supervisory and fiscal authorities are seen as not merely
anachronisms, but absolutely essential to avoid panic. A general sense
of broadly available efficiencies, fostering highly leveraged operations
with tight margins arbitraged across great distances, all very well oiled,
that for years made 'European' solutions seem so sensible, can be and was
quickly replaced by sudden recognition ofwidespread mis pricing, radical
uncertainty, especially about counterparty risk, acute problems of illi
quidity even among fundamentally solvent institutions, the insolvency of
major institutions, negotiations held over weekends, the need for effec
tive power and the indispensability of national institutions. This is so
even if national action presents prisoner's dilemma problems - that is,
when a coordinated response would have, in theory, been more efficient.
Although the trilemma is most evident when pricing fails, and the
intellectual edifice ofliberal economics is rumoured to be collapsing, the
trilemma itself is very much a product of liberal political economy. In
the traditional push toward 'rigour', the trilemma assumes governments
that are able to assess the relative costs of different courses of action, and
that act in rational and self-interested fashion upon their assessments.
Suffice it to say that such rationality does not describe the action of any of
the governments going into the 2008 crisis; it is precisely the risk manage
ment edifice that failed. Thus, while it is true that many Member State
governments acted in the national, rather than the European, interest, it is
a stretch to say that such action was particularly rational, or that any of the
governments could have had more than the haziest sense of what the
ramifications of various courses of action might have been.
The trilemma reflects its roots in liberal economics in another way:
government action is thought of as essentially distinct from marketplace
action - i.e. politics are distinct from markets, and the purpose ofpolitics
is to facilitate markets. The traditional bifurcation between markets and
politics is especially implausible in times offinancial crisis, when 'private'
institutions are supported by direct injections of tax dollars. More gen
erally, the financial markets are hardly independent of political pro
cesses, and so the assumption that financial stability is a cardinal virtue
for constitutional thought is unwarranted. The analytic question for
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political economy is: How do those aspects of social life that we understand as 'political' interpenetrate those aspects oflife that we understand
as 'economic'? The normative question for political economy is: 'What
sort of markets do we, as a society, wish to construct'? Such questions
cannot be asked from within liberal orthodoxy, which distinguishes too
strongly between government and market, public and private interest. In
short, much contemporary analysis of the situation of the European
financial structure is subtly dependent on the beleaguered orthodoxies
of liberal economics; it hardly needs saying that the same intellectual
dependency hampers policy thought in the United States.
As sketchy as the foregoing has been, my next point is more speculative still. It seems that a second implicit, and vital, aspect of much
contemporary European thinking about financial regulation is a particular imagination of politics that silently structures, indeed dominates,
policy thought. Political action is conceived in terms of jurisdiction to
regulate, and is essentially exclusive. Thus, by way of example, the
trilemma assumes that if we wish to have good markets (financial
stability), a choice must be made regarding jurisdiction over those
markets - i.e. a choice between European and Member State regulators
(here again, using 'regulators' in the broadest sense). Moreover, the
choice for national rather than European law that appears to be politically necessary at the moment'is understood to be somewhat retrograde;
progress is understood to be the centralisation ofvital politics (monetary,
eventually diplomatic and perhaps military) within dedicated European
institutions. From this perspective, which perhaps should be associated
with former European Commission chief Jacques Delors, political progress in Europe essentially maps that ofthe modern administrative State:
a linear evolution towards ever-more rational, centralised and bureaucratic forms of social life.
It need not be, indeed was not always, thus. For many years, the
European project was publicly and privately said to be 'sui generis'.
The European project was understood, except perhaps by some of the
English, to be more than trade and different from the nation, to be some
sort of new politics. The terms and form of that politics, however, were
admittedly emergent, as yet unclear, hence sui generis. This lack of
definition was fruitful: 'Europe' provided just enough of a horizon to
organise significant political thought and action for decades. At least to
this friendly outside observer, at some point during the 1990s - after
the Single European Act (SEA), perhaps with Maastricht, certainly
by EMU - the European imaginary shifted. Although the phrase
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'United States of Europe' remained a bit vulgar, used pejoratively by
Eurosceptics, many people in fact started conceiving of Europe as a very
diverse, continental, republican, commercial polity - i.e. much like the
United States. And such polities, as the United States has demonstrated,
need constitutions. 8 From within this perspective, the 'political' requirement that financial regulation (in practice if not theory) and intervention
and resolution (in theory and practice) be conducted on the Member
State level is seen as a setback for the European project.
Conversely, from within this same perspective, progress is understood
to be the transferral of politics from areas of smaller geographical scope
to areas of larger geographical scope; from 'lower' to 'higher' 'levels' of
government; and from the Member States to the European institutions.
So the trilemma strongly implies that moving the supervision and regulation of financial institutions to the European level will generate
financial stability.
A word of intellectual caution is in order here. While constitutional
arguments always maintain that better politics will flow from the establishment of a better structure, real life tends to be messier. Assuming
perhaps heroically that large Member States do not capture regulatory
processes, making the law of financial institutions an essentially
European affair may remove the structural tendency toward fragmentation demonstrated during this crisis. Merely federalising financial law,
however, hardly guarantees its effectiveness. Although the situation in
the United States is complicated, it is generally thought that the Federal
Reserve did not acquit itself very well in the years leading into the crisis,
and numerous mistakes have been made in the management of the crisis
itself. And as has long been noted both in Europe and especially in the
United States, centralisation of power raises its own dangers.
More generally, the failure to realise a European financial law is only a
setback if the European financial order should be highly centralised. But
it would be unfortunate if the destiny of Europe was to be a highly
centralised State, not least because that destiny will be frustrated for
the foreseeable future - that is, European politics will be understood as
a failure. Even assuming that it would be a good idea to integrate financial
regulation, supervision, resolution and presumably a degree of taxation
8

It can be said that the centralising tendency was always balanced by the countervailing
idea of subsidiarity. True enough, but as the name suggests, 'subsidiarity' is a derivative
concept, an argument against the presumption of centralisation. Conversely, subsidiarity
is hardly a strong argument for politics; it is not constitutive.
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on the European level, such integration is not going to happen soon.
And, it should be said, the identical argument could be made on a global
level: the existence of an integrated global economy requires global
regulatory structures - i.e., not just the current flaccid collection of
institutions and precatory laws, but a real global government. I am not
holding my breath.
But suppose the issue is not merely one of noble (European) ideals
frustrated by harsh (national) political realities? Perhaps rationalising
centralisation is not, even in principle, the only horizon for politics,
including the politics of financial regulation? Surely there is much to be
said for nations and other polities, even in an age of economic and other
integrations? And should the possibility that Europe represents a new
form of political life, something that does not appear very often on the
world stage, be given up quite so easily?
Visiting the United States, Tocqueville at first wondered at a large
country that seemed, to an astounding degree, to function without
government. Upon further observation and reflection, Tocqueville rea
lised that he had overlooked the prevalence oflocal administrations, and
had mistaken the absence of centralised administration for a lack of
governance. Clearly society in the United States governed itself, indeed
constituted a union, implying a substantial degree of centralisation of
some sort, even if not the hub and scope organisation of statutory
authority radiating out from the capital with which he was familiar.
So Tocqueville famously distinguished between 'administrative centra
lisation' and 'governmental centralisation'. 9 What Tocqueville meant
by 'administrative centralisation' is clear enough, exemplified by the
France of his day and ours. What he meant by 'governmental centralisa
tion' is more difficult to say: sometimes the phrase is associated with the
(national) legislature (that does not have administrative powers under
the US Constitution); sometimes with democracy writ large, and some
times with the sources of strength and unity within a society. Clearly,
however, Tocqueville was on to something important: the United States,
for all its millions of people and vast spaces and enormous tangle of
jurisdictions, is a very unified polity and, critically for present purposes,
an integrated financial market. This unification is not a result ofjurisdic
tional unity, for the simple reason that, even after the Civil War and the
New Deal, there is no jurisdictional unity. The principles ofunity must be
9

My thanks to Nicolas Veron for raising Toqueville's distinction vis-a-vis my argument.
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found at a deeper, societal or cultural, level. And yet such unity is
normative, regulatory, governmental.
My thought is that governmental centralisation could be a key way to
reconceptualise financial policy - indeed, politics more generally - in
Europe, thereby helping to free political discourse from the coils of the
jurisdictional fight articulated by the trilemma. And if we look at
European history more broadly, we see a great deal of political life
without administrative centralisation, that is, across a wealth of jurisdictions. Germany and Italy were political contexts for centuries before they
had anything resembling centralised administrations. Since the Middle
Ages, the lex mercatoria has made commerce possible among traders
from many different countries. And for generations the Roman law was
'the' law virtually everywhere in Europe, quite independent ofwhether or
not, or how, it was the positive law in this or that place. In short, history
teaches that political economy does not require the degree of unity of
authority that is so often presumed.
It might be said, however, that this is an essentially medieval view, that
the story of modernity is the subordination of the nobles to the king, of
local authority to central administration, of ideal laws and customary
trading patterns to positive laws and regulated markets. I disagree.
Moving from history to comparison, the United States demonstrates a
tightly integrated, highly modern, market - indeed, the paradigmatic
diversified economy - and a great number of jurisdictions, and conversely, a notable shortfall in formal administrative centralisation and
attendant positive law. The degree of decentralisation in the United
States is, on reflection, quite astonishing. Consider the following:
• Property, contract and tort (delict, which stands in lieu ofa fair degree
of regulation) are all overwhelmingly State law.
• Corporations are State law; there is no national company law.
• Banks may be chartered on either the State or the Federal level. Both
individual States and the Federal government regulate banks and
sipiilar institutions.
• Insurance companies are regulated almost exclusively by the States.
• Securities law is mostly Federal law, but States retain the authority to
regulate securities.
• Criminal law, including matters such as fraud, is both Federal and
State.
The point here is not that the United States has it 'right'. Regulations in
the United States, like anyplace else, are variously successful, and this
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1

chapter is not long enough for thoughtful suggestions about particular 1
.,
aspects of US financial regulation that might be worth European atten- !
tion, by way of either adoption or avoidance. Moreover, it should not be
denied that the multiplicity of jurisdictions in the United States can
create waste and confusion. It is quite possible that insurance, for exam
ple, should be regulated on the Federal, and not the State, level. Those
things said, the point here is that the United States demonstrates that a
highly integrated financial market can be created among multiple jur
isdictions. This fact provides a modicum of hope, because it means that,
in a global context of multiple nation-states, or in a European context of
multiple Member States, as in a Federal context, politics need not be
understood to be coterminous with jurisdiction - i.e. political discourse
is not delimited by the authority of the modern administrative nation
state. Therefore, the impossibility of achieving a politics coterminous
with jurisdiction does not necessarily imply that political efforts are
doomed. More specifically, the fact that Member States are not going
to cede supervisory, much less resolution, powers over their financial
institutions to European institutions does not mean that European
financial policy is at an end. More hopefully still, the realisation that
politics may transcend jurisdiction may help renew the spirit of
European political invention.
Just suppose that European politics comes to understand itself along
the lines suggested here, in terms of governmental centralisation, of a
European culture of government. What would such an understanding of
European politics mean for policy? What specific programmes should
European institutions adopt if they intend to improve financial regula
tion, even while jurisdiction remains national?
In the absence ofauthority to proceed positively on the European level,
perforce modest starts on European financial reform have been made
through international colleges of financial institution supervisors, and
through enthusiasm for 'living wills' and other industry initiatives. One
might hope that such efforts contribute to a more European, and wiser,
collective understanding of financial regulation. At the same time, it
should be rather dourly noted that such measures were not legally
binding, and were not strong enough to ensure cooperation during the
2008 crisis, raising the question of whether the improved versions cur
rently under discussion will fare any better in a future crisis. More
broadly, it should be remembered that meetings among upper-level
bureaucrats, trained internationally, in disciplines formed internation
ally, are hardly new. European elites have generally had international·
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experience and, within limitations, a 'European' perspective. And during
the 2008 crisis, such elites acted in national as opposed to European
fashion.
So how might a deeper European governmental centralisation be
pursued, while respecting the prerogatives of Member State authorities?
Two obvious places to start would be education and law, and, fortui
tously for the purpose of honouring Vagts, the combination of education
and law: legal education. As Tocqueville recognised, and as remains true,
Americans exhibit a surprising degree of uniformity in all sorts of
regards, despite the land's vast spaces, and the various cultural back
grounds and beliefs of her people. In particular, Americans share beliefs
and assumptions about the institutions of commercial society: property,
contract and the like. (Americans often and erroneously think that their
beliefs about such institutions are natural.) So, Tocqueville also recog
nised, one of the most important vectors for governmental centralisation
in the United States is law. This has become more true since Tocqueville's
day, with the development of the modern law school. While the law
taught in law schools is largely (not exclusively) State law, it is not the law
of any given State - any basic casebook contains laws from multiple
jurisdictions at different times, with no direct or authoritative bearing
upon one another. Rather than the positive law of any given jurisdiction,
what is taught is legal culture in a general American sense. As a result,
people trained at Harvard Law School, in the hardly economically domi
nant State of Massachusetts, can and do practice American (not US) law
all over the United States, and indeed around the world.
This is not to say that positive law is unimportant. But, in a preceden
tial system, with fifty States, a Federal government and countless regu
lators, practitioners are expected to look up the positive law of the
relevant jurisdiction, so that they are absolutely current, and can cite
the immediately responsible authority. Legal thought, and policy dis
course more generally, tends to happen on the cultural plane, rather than
that of positive law.
The national legal culture and State jurisdiction are often understood
in complementary, mutually reinforcing, fashion. Notably, the licensing
oflawyers (and other professionals) is usually a State function. Typically,
State bar associations administer an exam. A candidate for the bar is only
allowed to sit for the exam, however, if she has graduated from an
accredited law school. And law schools are accredited by the American
Bar Association (ABA) - i.e. on.a national basis. Moreover, in most
States, the first day of the exam is the so-called Multistate exam - i.e.
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an exam written by the ABA and based on the national understanding of
fundamental areas of law, rather than on the particular rules of a given
State.
Surely it would be possible to imagine European financial politics
along structurally similar lines - as an essentially cultural discourse
that informed the thinking of more localised authorities and, as importantly, market participants. The impasse ostensibly revealed by the 2008
financial crisis is an artifact of certain unnecessary assumptions about
politics rather than an intractable flaw in the European constitution. But
while the political structure ofEurope does not preclude serious rethinking of European financial markets, one must not expect too much from
mere constitutional reconceptualisations. A lively continental discourse
on financial policy, held in an integrated market stretching across any
number ofjurisdictions, has not always kept the United States from folly,
notably in the 2008 crisis. Financial policy, like politics more generally,
can be expected to remain difficult.

